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PhantomKiller/README.md
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2026-05-19 07:14:40 +00:00

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PhantomKiller

weaponizing a signed lenovo kernel driver to terminate any process — including EDR/AV protected processes.

overview

PhantomKiller abuses BootRepair.sys, a legitimate lenovo driver shipped with Lenovo PC Manager. the driver exposes a device object (\\.\BootRepair) with no DACL restrictions and a single IOCTL (0x222014) that takes a 4-byte PID and calls ZwTerminateProcess, no access checks, no caller validation, no protection.

full writeup: Phantom Killer — Reverse Engineering and Weaponizing a Lenovo Driver to Terminate EDR Processes

driver details

field value
file name BootRepair.sys
sha256 5ab36c116767eaae53a466fbc2dae7cfd608ed77721f65e83312037fbd57c946
signer LENOVO (Symantec Class 3 SHA256 Code Signing CA)
compiled 2018-01-03
arch x64
VT detections 0/71 at time of discovery

vulnerability summary

  • device object created without secure DACL — any user can open a handle
  • IRP_MJ_CREATE (MajorFunction[0]) has no access checks
  • IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL (MajorFunction[14]) accepts IOCTL 0x222014
  • input: 4-byte DWORD (target PID)
  • internally calls PsLookupProcessByProcessIdObOpenObjectByPointerZwTerminateProcess
  • kills any process including PPL-protected AV/EDR processes

attack scenarios

driver already loaded: any low-privileged user can open the device and terminate any process on the system.

BYOVD: an attacker loads the signed driver via sc.exe or similar, then uses it to kill EDR processes before deploying post-exploitation tools.

usage

sc.exe create PhantomKiller binPath="C:\Path\to\BootRepair.sys" type=kernel
sc.exe start PhantomKiller
PhantomKiller.exe <pid>

disclaimer

this project is for educational and authorized security research purposes only. do not use this against systems you do not own or have explicit permission to test. the author is not responsible for any misuse.

author

j3h4ck@j3h4ck | linkedin | medium